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ABSTRACT 
For approximately two years the United States has been detaining individuals at its 
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Almost all of the detainees have been held 
virtually incommunicado; without charge, without access to lawyers and without any 
means of challenging the legality of their detention. The United States has raised a 
number of international law arguments in support of its treatment of the detainees. 
These arguments concern the legal nature of the United States naval base at 
Guantanamo, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider whether those arguments are consistent with the 
principles of international law. The paper concludes that United States' treatment of 
the detainees is in breach of fundamental principles of international law and could 
have a detrimental impact on international laws its future development. 
Word Length: The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 14,844 words. 
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I THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES AND THEIR "LEGAL BLACK 
HOLE" 
Since January 2002, the world's most powerful democracy has been 
detaining hundreds of suspected members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda at the 
United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("Guantanamo"), as part of 
its "war on terrorism". 1 
The "war on terrorism" was declared in response to the terrorist attacks on the 
United States of 11 September 2001 in which approximately 3000 people lost 
their lives. Shortly after the attacks, the United States Congress passed a joint 
resolution authorising the President to use:2 
... all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons. 
On 7 October 2001, the President sent armed forces to Afghanistan to seek out 
and subdue the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime which 
provided it with sanctuary. 3 As a result of military operations in Afghanistan, 
and elsewhere, the United States has detained citizens of at least 43 countries.4 
Approximately 660 of those people currently find themselves at Guantanamo. 5 
The Guantanamo detainees are an extremely diverse group. There are 
detainees from Afghanistan and the Islamic States of Asia and the Middle East, 
but also from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Sweden and the United 
1 Lord Steyn "Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole" (27th FA Mann Lecture, London, 25 
November 2003) . 
2 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224,224 (2001). 
3 Presidential Address to the Nation (7 October 2001) Available at <http: //www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html> (last accessed 28 February 2004). 
4 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to US Law and 
Policy since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties (Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights, New York, 2003), 47. Available at <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_ law/loss 
/imbalance/powers.pdf> (last accessed 22 February 2004). 
5 Nancy Gibbs "Inside the Wire" (8 December 2003) Tim e New York 40. 
Kingdom.6 Although 85 percent of detainees are aged between 20 an
d 40, some 
are very old whereas others are juveniles.
7 Some are well educated and 
westernised, while others are not at all. 
8 They range from the strictly secular to 
the deeply devout.9 Most detainees were arrested in Afghanistan, but o
thers were 
picked up in places as far away as Bosnia, Zambia and Gambia.
10 
The majority of the detainees are held in three maximum security cell 
blocks. 
These detainees live in solitary confinement, in cells measuring six-fo
ot-eight by 
six-foot (fifty-four square feet), almost 24 hours per day.
11 Twice a week they 
get 20 to 30 minutes to shower and exercise.
12 They are also let out for 
interrogation sessions which can last for anywhere between one a
nd sixteen 
hours. 13 
The names of the detainees are classified, as are the reasons fo
r their 
incarceration.
14 However it has been reported that there are no ''big fish" among 
those detained at Guantanamo.
15 
6 David Rose "Operation Take away my Freedom: Inside Guantana
mo Bay" (January 2004) 
Vanity Fair New York 58, 66. 
7 The United States recently released the three youngest detainees at G
uantanamo aged between 
13 and 15. However other juveniles aged 16 and 17 continue to be
 held. See Ian James "US 
officials still holding juveniles in Guantanamo prison for terror su
spects" (30 January 2004) 
Associated Press Newswires. 
8 James Meek "The People the Law Forgot" (3 December 2003) The Gu
ardian London 1. 
9 Meek, above. 
10 David Rose "Operation Take away my Freedom: Inside Guantanam
o Bay'' (January 2004) 
Vanity Fair New York 58, 66. 
11 Rose, above, 62. See also Charles Savage "Growth at Base Show
s firm stage on Military 
Detention" (24 August 2003) The Miami Herald Miami Al. 
12 Nancy Gibbs "Inside the Wire" (8 December 2003) Time New York 4
0. 
13 Gibbs, above. 
14 Rose, above, 66. The Bush Administration has, however, recently dis
closed some information 
regarding some of those held at Guantanamo. Among them are terro
rists involved in the attacks 
on the US embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole, a former body
guard of Osama Bin Laden 
and an Al Qaeda explosives expert who designed a prototype shoe bom
b for destroying airplanes. 
See Charlie Savage "US May Detain Terror Suspects for Years L
ooks to Appoint a Parole 
Board" (14 February 2004) The Boston Globe Boston A4. 
15 Bob Drogin ''No Leaders of Al Qaeda Found at Guantanamo" (18
 August 2002) The Los 
Angeles Times Los Angeles. See also Rose, above, 66. 
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Almost all of the detainees have been held virtually incommunicado; without 
charge, without access to lawyers and without any means of challenging the 
legality of their detention. 16 One current detainee, in a short postcard to his 
family which slipped past censors, described Guantanamo as a place where "you 
don't have the right to have rights." 17 
The position adopted by the United States in relation to Guantanan10 raises a 
number of distinct international law issues. Firstly, there is the issue of who 
actually exercises sovereignty there. As discussed below, the United States 
acquired Guantanamo pursuant to a lease agreement which provided it with 
"complete jurisdiction and control" but reserved "ultimate sovereignty" for Cuba. 
The Bush Administration has argued that because ''ultimate sovereignty'' remains 
with Cuba, the United States domestic courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any 
claims made by detainees pursuant to United States domestic law. 18 
The Bush Administration's view with regard to jurisdiction has been 
challenged in recent litigation, brought before the United States courts, on behalf 
of various detainees. To date, different circuits of the United States Court of 
Appeals have reached conflicting- opinions on the issues of jurisdiction and 
sovereignty. 19 The debate is set to be resolved definitively by the United States 
Supreme Court later this year. 20 
16 It should be noted that two detainees have recently be designated for trial before US military 
commission and those detainees have been assigned Counsel. See Neil A Lewis "US Charges 
Two at Guantanamo with Conspiracy'' (25 February 2004) New York Times New York Al. 
17 James Meek "The People the Law Forgot" (3 December 2003) The Guardian London 1. 
18 The United States' position is primarily based on a 1942 decision of the United States Supreme 
Court which held that German nationals detained outside US sovereign territory, albeit under the 
control of the US military, lacked standing to bring petitions for habeas corpus in the United 
States domestic courts. See Johnson v Eisentrager (1950) 339 US 763. 
19 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that Guantanamo was not part of 
the sovereign territory of the United States. It held accordingly that it had no jurisdiction to hear 
the detainees' claims. See Al Odah v United States (2003) 321 F 3d 1134 (DC Cir). However the 
9th Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Guantanamo was part of the sovereign 
territory of the United States, and that consequently it would have jurisdiction. It is noteworthy 
that the 9th Circuit appears to have taken the view that it would have had jurisdiction even in the 
absence of technical sovereignty due to the fact that the United States exercised sole territorial 
jurisdiction at Guantanamo. See Gherebi v Bush (2003) 352 F 3d 1278 (9th Cir). 
20 The order granting certiorari is available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/ 
courtorders/l l 1003pzor.pdf.> (last accessed 2 March 2004). 
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The second type of international law issue raised at Guantanamo concerns the 
area of international human rights law, a body of law setting out the fundamental 
rights attributable to all human beings. As discussed below, the vanous 
instruments, making up the body of international human rights law, contain 
articles against the arbitrary detention of any individual. The Bush 
Administration has submitted, however, that international human rights law is 
inapplicable in respect of the detainees because they were captured in the course 
of an armed conflict and consequently their capture and detention is governed 
exclusively by international humanitarian law.
2 1 The Administration has also 
advanced the subsidiary proposition that particular human rights instruments, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not binding 
on the United States outside its own sovereign territory.
22 
A third area of international law which is relevant in respect of the detainees 
is international humanitarian law, which is codified in the Geneva Conventions, 
and prescribes rules for the treatment of individuals in times of war or armed 
conflict. While the Bush Administration has agreed to treat the detainees in a 
manner consistent with the Geneva Conventions, they deny that the detainees are 
entitled to the protections usually afforded to prisoners of war.
23 They justify 
this stance by submitting that neither Taliban, nor Al Qaeda, detainees meet the 
conditions for being considered lawful combatants under the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.
24 
Humanitarian law provides for the convening of a "competent tribunal" in 
cases of doubt regarding whether a particular detainee qualifies for prisoner of 
21 See Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the Inter American Commission 
on Human Rights (15 April 2002). 
22 Kristine A Huskey "Gitmo, A Legal No-Mans Land: The Status of the Detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (New Zealand Centre for Public Law: Public Lecture, Wellington, 10 
February 2004). The Bush Administration has raised a further argument, specifically in relation 
to the ICCPR, which is that it does not bind the United States as it is not a "self-executing" 
document. This is essentially a US domestic law issue which consequently falls outside the 
scope of this paper. 
23 See Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (7 February 2002) available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207- l 3 .html> (last accessed 27 
February 2004). 
24 Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, above. 
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war status.25 No individualised status hearing has ever been convened in respect 
to any particular detainee at Guantanamo; the US has dismissed the need to do 
so, asserting that "there is no doubt about their status."26 
The Bush Administration submits that because the detainees are being held in 
connection with the "war on terror" it is not under an obligation to release and 
repatriate them until the "war on terror" is won. For example in a letter to the 
United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention they have stated:27 
There is broad authority under the laws and customs of war to detain enemy 
combatants, without any requirement to bring criminal charges while 
hostilities last. The detention of an enemy combatant is not an act of 
punishment but one of security and military necessity. It serves the 
important purpose of preventing an enemy combatant from continuing to 
fight against us. There is no law requiring a detaining power to prosecute 
enemy combatants or to release them prior to the end of hostilities. 
Likewise, under the laws and customs of war, detained enemy combatants 
have no right of access to counsel or courts to challenge their detention. 
We cannot have an international legal system in which honourable soldiers 
who abide by the law of armed conflict and are captured on the battlefield 
may be detained and held until the end of a war, but terrorists who violate 
the law of armed conflict must be released and allowed to continue their 
belligerent, unlawful or terrorist activities. 
The United States Defence Secretary has recently expressed a desire that 
none of the detainees is held for "any longer than is absolutely necessary."28 
However the Administration has previously conceded that the war on terror may 
last for many years to come.29 
25 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 
UNTS 135, art 5. 
26 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (2 April 2003). Available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/ 
Huridoca.nsfi'TestFrame/9a14ba739a04fb2fc1256d050035483c?Opendocument> (last accessed 
22 February 2004). 
27 Letter from the Pennanent Mission of the United States to the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (2 April 2003). Available at <http ://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/ 
Huridoca.nsfi'TestFrame/9a 14 ba73 9a04 fb2fc 1256d050035483c?Opendocument> (last accessed 
22 February 2004). 
28 Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks to the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce (13 February 2004 ). 
Available at <http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20040213-0445.htm1> (last accessed 28 
February 2004). 
29 See, for example, President Bush 's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (20 September 2001). Available at <http;//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 
20010920-8.html> (last accessed 28 February 2004). 
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The United States' treatment of detainees at Guantanamo has been met by a 
chorus of disapproval from the international community. For example the 
English Court of Appeal, in considering the plight of a British detainee at 
Guantanamo, has stated that:
30 
... we do not find it possible to approach this claim for judicial review other 
than on the basis that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles 
recognised by [the United States and the United Kingdom] and by 
international law, Mr Abbasi is at present arbitrarily detained in a "legal 
black-hole." 
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the positions taken by the 
United States, as discussed above, are consistent with the principles of 
international law. The paper will commence by exploring the United States' 
view that Guantanamo is Cuban sovereign territory. The arguments the United 
States has advanced in relation to the non-applicability of international human 
rights law, will then be explored. The third part of the paper will consider the 
United States' assertions regarding the applicability of international humanitarian 
law. The paper will conclude by considering whether the detainees are being 
treated in accordance with international law. Some remarks will also be made 
regarding the future implications for international law, which could result from 
the position the United States has taken at Guantanamo. 
II THE LEGAL STATUS OF GUANTANAMO BAY 
The naval base at Guantanamo is the United States' oldest offshore military 
base, and has been in operation for approximately 100 years.
31 It exceeds 45 
square miles in size and is entirely self sufficient with its own water, plant, 
schools, transportation and entertainment facilities.
32 The population at 
Guantanamo has tripled to more than 6000 since January 2002.
33 
30 Abbasi v Secretary of State (2003) 42 ILM 358, 374 (CA). 
31 ME Murphy The History Of Guantanamo Bay: An Online Edition (1964). Available at 
<www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm> (last accessed 22 February 2004) . 
32 Gerald L Neuman "Anomalous Zones" (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 1197, 1198. 
33 Nancy Gibbs "Inside the Wire" (8 December 2003) Time New York 40. 
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The United States occupies Guantanamo by virtue of two 1903 lease 
agreements entered into with Cuba as amended by a subsequent agreement of 
1934. However the unusual nature of these agreements raises major questions 
regarding whether Cuba can still claim to be sovereign at Guantanamo, as the 
Bush Administration asserts, or whether sovereignty can be said to have passed 
to the United States. Finding an answer to this question necessitates an 
examination of the terms of the Guantanamo lease and consideration of how, as a 
general matter, leases are treated under principles of international law. However 
before looking at these matters it is first necessary to briefly clarify what is meant 
by the term "sovereignty". 
A What is sovereignty? 
The term "sovereignty m the relations between States signifies 
independence."34 It refers to the supreme authority which is exercised by a State 
independently of any other earthly authority. 35 The concept of sovereignty can 
be said to have three dimensions: external independence, internal independence 
and supreme authority. 36 
A state has external independence when it enjoys personal liberty of action 
outside its borders in its intercourse with other states. As a consequence, a 
sovereign state can, unless restricted by treaty, manage its international affairs 
according to its discretion; in particular it can enter into alliances and treaties, 
send and receive diplomatic envoys, acquire and cede territory, and make war 
and peace. 37 
34 Island of Pa/mas Case (The Netherlands v. United States) (1928) 2 UN Rep Intl Arb Awards 
829, 838. 
35 R Jennings and A Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law (Volume I: Peace) (9 ed, 
Longman, London, 1992) 122. 
36 Jennings and Watts, above, 382. 
37 Jennings and Watts, above, 382. 
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Internal independence refers to a state's liberty of action within its borders
. 
A sovereign state is free to: adopt any constitution it wants, arrange
 its 
administration as it sees fit, enact whatever laws and commercial policie
s it 
desires and so on. 
38 
A sovereign state exercises supreme authority in two senses. Firstly i
t 
exercises supreme authority over all persons and things within its bor
ders 
(territorial sovereignty). Secondly it exercises supreme authority over its citi
zens 
whether at home or abroad (political sovereignty).
39 
Sovereign states, being their own masters, are able to dispose of thei
r 
sovereign rights as they please, even to the point of annihilating themselves 
as a 
subject of international law.
40 Accordingly once a state has undertaken certain 
obligations through treaties or agreements, it is bound under international la
w to 
fulfil them.4
1 
The ability of a sovereign to give up sovereign rights by treaty is particularly
 
relevant for present purposes because, as discussed below, it appears to
 be 
exactly what Cuba has done with regard to the Guantanamo leasehold. 
B The Guantanamo Bay Leasehold 
The United States acquired Guantanamo as a consequence of the Spanish-
American War of 1898. On 20 April 1898 the United States Cong
ress 
demanded, by joint resolution, that the Government of Spain "at once relinq
uish 
its authority and government in the Island and Cuba and withdraw its land 
and 
38 Jennings and Watts, above, 382. 
39Jennings and Watts, above, 382. 
40 
R.P. Anaud "Sovereign Equality of States in International Law" (1986 II) 
197 Recueil Des 
Cours 1, 32. 
41 R.P. Anaud, above, 33. 
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naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters".42 Interestingly for present purposes, 
however, the resolution provided further:43 
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to 
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over the said island except for 
the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is 
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its 
people. 
On 25 April 1898 the United States declared war on Spain. Approximately 
three and a half months later, on 12 August 1898, the two nations signed a 
"Protocol of Agreement Embodying the Terms of a Basis for the Establishment 
of Peace between the United States and Spain". Finally, on 10 December 1898, a 
treaty of peace was concluded at Paris.44 The treaty relinquished Spanish 
sovereignty over Cuba and left the island to be occupied by the United States.45 
A new independent Cuban state was established on 20 May 1902. An 
Appendix to the new State's constitution set out the Cuban government's 
intention to lease or sell Cuban land to the United States, as a means of 
maintaining Cuba's independence and protecting its people.46 That intention was 
formalised pursuant to a lease agreement of 23 February 190347 (the "Lease"), 
which provided for the lease of Guantanamo Bay and Bahia Honda to the United 
States, and a supplementary lease agreement of 6 October 190348 (the 
"Supplementary Lease"). An additional treaty was entered into on 29 May 
42 See Joseph Lazar "International Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay'' (1968) 62 Am J Int'l L 
730,730. 
43 30 Stat 364 (1898). 
44 Treaty of Paris (10 December 1898) 30 Stat 1754 (United States - Spain). 
45 Lazar, above, 730. 
46 Article VII of the Appendix to the Cuban Constitution provided that: "To enable the United 
States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its 
own defense, the Cuban Government will sell or lease to the United States the lands necessary for 
coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the 
United States". This wording mirrored the wording that had previously been used by the United 
States Congress in amendment included in an Army appropriations Act. See 31 Stat 897 (1901). 
47 Agreement between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval 
Stations (23 February 1903) TS 418 (United States - Cuba). 
48 
Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations 
(16-23 February) TS 418 (United States - Cuba). 
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193449 to modify some of the terms of the 1903 agreements (the "1934 
Treaty''). 50 
It is possible to distinguish between two types of leases under public 
international law. Firstly, there are leases that provide for a lease of land 
together with some or all of the lessor's sovereign rights over that land. 
Secondly, there are leases that are more akin to the private law understanding of 
what constitutes a lease, involving a lease of land but no transfer in the exercise 
of sovereignty.5' It is not always clear, and in some cases sharply controversial, 
whether a lease is of the private law type or includes the exercise of sovereign 
rights.52 Each case will ultimately depend on its particular facts and the precise 
terms of the grant. 
53 
The nature of the rights granted to the United States at Guantanamo is set out 
in article III of the Lease which provides: 
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the 
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas 
of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that 
during the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under 
the terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete 
jurisdiction and control over and within said areas with the right to acquire 
(under conditions to be hereafter agreed upon by the two Governments) for 
the public purposes of the United States any land or other property therein 
by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the 
owners thereof. 
Thus pursuant to the Lease, Cuba has granted the United States "complete 
jurisdiction and control" at Guantanamo, while reserving "ultimate sovereignty'' 
for itself. 
49 Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba (29 May 1934) TS 866 (United States - Cuba). 
50 The Treaty of 29 May 1934 did not relate to Bahia Honda as the United States had
 already 
relinquished that area in exchange for larger boundaries at Guantanamo. See Jo
seph Lazar 
"International Legal Status ofGuantanamo Bay" (1968) 62 Am J Int'l L 730,735 . 
51 R Jennings and A Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law (Volum e I: Peace
) (9 ed, 
Longman, London, 1992) . 
52 J Virzijl International Law in Historical Perspective (Volume I) (AW Sijthoff-Leyden, 
Leyden, 
1968) 398. 
53 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (6 ed, Oxford University Press,
 Oxford, 
2003) 110-111. 
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The grant of "jurisdiction and control" to the United States undoubtedly 
means that the United States has acquired sovereign rights at Guantanamo. Chief 
among those rights is the ability to make law. Persons at Guantanamo, 
irrespective of whether they are United States citizens, are amenable to United 
States criminal and civil law. 54 Indeed the public affairs officer at Guantanamo 
has recently confirmed that all non-Americans arrested for a criminal offence at 
Guantanamo would be tried in a US Court, as would any civilian contractor. 55 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Cuba has held that the territory of 
Guantanamo is for all legal effects to be regarded as foreign. 56 This implies that 
Cuban law does not extend to United States military and civilian personnel on 
the base.57 
It is also noteworthy that the Guantanamo Lease will continue in effect until 
either the United States abandons the base or the Lease is terminated by mutual 
agreement between Cuba and the United States.58 Therefore the sovereign rights 
that the United States has acquired under the lease could continue indefinitely. 59 
The extent of the rights acquired by the United States under the Guantanamo 
leasehold has led one former conunander of the base to observe: 
Thus it is clear that at Guantanamo Bay we have a Naval reservation which, 
for all practical purposes, is American territory. Under the foregoing [lease] 
agreements, the United States has ... exercised the essential elements of 
sovereignty over this territory. Unless we abandon the area or agree to a 
54 See for example US v Lee ( 1990) 906 F 2d 117 ( 4th Cir) in which a Jamaican national was 
indicted to face charges before United States domestic courts for an alleged indecent assault he 
committed at Guantanamo Bay. 
55 David Rose "Operation Take away my Freedom: Inside Guantanamo Bay'' (January 2004) 
Vanity Fair New York 58, 72. 
56 See Jn re Guzman (1934) Ann Dig 112,113. The issue in that case was whether duty was 
payable in respect of three hogs imported into Cuba by the defendants from the naval station in 
Guantanamo Bay. The defendants argued that no duty was payable because the hogs had already 
been in Cuba. The Supreme Court of Cuba disagreed noting that "the territory of the naval 
Station is for all legal effects regarded as foreign". 
57 Gary L Maris "International Law and Guantanamo" ( 1967) 29 JP 261, 273. 
58 Article III, 1934 Treaty. 
59 The United States has at various times through history expressed an intention to remain at 
Guantanamo indefinitely. See Gary L Maris "International Law and Guantanamo" (1967) 29 JP 
261, 284-285. 
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modification in the tenns of our occupancy, we can continue in the present
 
status as long as we like. 
However despite the extent of the United States' jurisdiction and control a
t 
Guantanamo this is not a carte blanche.
60 The Lease records the continuance of 
the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba. 
The existence of continuing Cuban sovereignty is evidenced by vanous
 
obligations and restrictions placed on the United States in their administratio
n of 
the base pursuant to the Lease Agreements. The restrictions require that, i
nter 
alia, the United States uses Guantanamo solely for the purposes of a naval 
and 
coaling station
61 and that it agrees not to allow the establishment and 
maintenance of commercial, industrial or other enterprises at the base
62
. The 
United States is also obliged to pay rent
63 and to allow Cuban vessels engaged in 
Cuban trade free passage through the waters leased to it at Guantanamo. 
64 
The existence of these types of obligations and restrictions seems inconsisten
t 
with the view that the United States is sovereign at Guantanamo since it sugg
ests 
that its authority at Guantanamo is not exercised independently of any o
ther 
earthly authority. 
Up until the termination of diplomatic relations between the United States
 
and Cuba in 1961 , following the Cuban revolution, the United States lar
gely 
adhered to the terms stipulated in the lease agreements. 
65 Since that time, 
however, the United States has begun to act in breach of some of the terms o
f the 
Lease Agreements. Those breaches have become more pronounced in re
cent 
times. For example, while the Lease restricts the use of Guantanamo to a n
aval 
base or coaling station, the base was used as a detention facility for Haitian
 and 
Cuban refugees during the 1990s and now, of course, for individuals held as 
part 
60 See Gary L Maris "International Law and Guantanamo" (1967) 29 JP 261 , 266. 
61 Articles I and II, Lease. 
62 Article III, Supplementary Lease. 
63 Article I, Supplementary Lease. 
64 Article II, Lease. 
65 See Gary L Maris "International Law and Guantanamo" (1 967) 29 JP 261 . 
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of the "war on terror". Similarly the fact that fast food chains such as 
McDonalds, Pizza Hut and KFC now operate at Guantanamo66 would appear to 
be in breach of Article III of the Supplementary Lease, which forbids the 
establishment of commercial enterprises there. 
The fact that the United States has been able to operate in breach of the terms 
of the leases without accountability has led some commentators and the majority 
in the Gherebi case67 to assert that the United States, not Cuba, exercises 
sovereignty at Guantanamo. 
It is submitted, however, that this view is incorrect. The legal basis of United 
States' jurisdiction at Guantanamo is the Lease; a document which reserves for 
Cuba, "ultimate sovereignty''. The fact that Cuba lacks the political and military 
might necessary to enforce the terms of the Leases does not affect Cuba's 
ultimate sovereignty over Guantanamo. The position was put as follows by the 
minority in Gherebi: 68 
The ability to violate terms of an agreement with impunity does not render a 
party legally free to ignore the agreement. It means only that the party in 
breach is spared the practical consequences of its improper acts. 
[E]ven if the United States has violated the Lease, it simply is big enough 
and strong enough that Cuba has been unable to enforce its legal 
entitlements. This difference in power does not erase the United States' 
obligations under the Lease, nor does it mean that Guantanamo is a part of 
the sovereign territory of the United States. The Lease is actually a lease, 
albeit a highly unusual one with a very pushy tenant. 
The above view is in accordance with the view of a number of authors on the 
topic of international law who have expressed the view that leases of territory do 
not create changes in sovereignty. For example, one treatise has observed that:69 
Leases of territory, regardless of the length of time specified in the relevant 
agreements do not confer title, do not create changes in sovereignty. 
66 See Nancy Gibbs "Inside the Wire" (8 December 2003) Time New York 40. 
67 Gherebi v Bush (2003) 352 F 3d 1278 (9th Cir). See footnote 19. 
68 GherebivBush, above, 1310. 
69 
Gerhard von Glahn Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1965) 269. 
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Authorities and statesmen have been in agreement that the conclusion of a 
lease treaty only effects a transfer of jurisdictional rights but does not at all 
effect an alienation of territory. In other words, sovereign rights are 
exercised by the leasing state, but title to the territory remains indisputably 
with the state granting the lease. This is true even when the lease entails use 
of the territory as a naval or military base by the leasing state, such as 
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, leased but not ceded to the United States. 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the question of who is "sovereign" in 
a particular territory is a legal question rather than a political one. One author 
has commented that: 
70 
Undue concentration on a political interpretation of legal phenomena has 
had the effect of obscuring another significant example of division of 
territorial sovereignty, namely, the division between the exercise of 
sovereignty and sovereignty proper. 
[T]he distinction between the exercise of the rights of sovereignty and 
residuary sovereignty proper is significant and, it is submitted, correct in 
principle. There is always a danger in attempting to comprehend the 
realities of a situation at the expense of the realities of the law. It is not the 
business of the law to give a political interpretation, however closely 
approximating the facts, of the legal situation. The gap between the two is a 
creature of the parties and must not be bridged by attempts at realism. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice has also held in Lighthouses in 
Greece and Samas (Greece v France/
1 that the giving up of sovereign rights is 
not the same as the giving up sovereignty. The Court there was asked to consider 
whether a contract entered into between a French company and the Ottoman 
Empire (Turkey) in 1913 in relation to a lighthouse in Crete would be binding on 
Greece who gained sovereignty over Crete from the Ottoman Empire following 
the conclusion of the First World War. 
Greece argued that at the time that the contract was entered into Turkey had 
already ceased to exercise sovereignty over Crete, since Turkey had previously, 
in 1899 and 1907, conferred upon Crete full autonomy with regard to its internal 
and external affairs in response to international pressure. 
The dissenting judge, Judge Hudson, found that the residuary sovereignty of 
the Sultan was "a sovereignty shorn of the last vestige of power". He urged that 
70 H Lauterpacht International Law: Collected Papers (Volume I) (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1970) 372. 
71 Lighthouses in Greece and Samas (Greece v France)(l937) PCIJ Series A/B No 71. 
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"a juridical concept must not be stretched to breaking point" and that "a ghost of 
hollow sovereignty cannot be permitted to obscure the realities of this 
situation"72. However the ten judges comprising the majority disagreed. They 
held that: 73 
Notwithstanding its autonomy, Crete has not ceased to be part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Even thought the Sultan had been obliged to accept 
important restrictions on the exercise of his rights of sovereignty in Crete, 
that sovereignty had not ceased to belong to him, however it might be 
qualified from a juridicial point of view. 
Accordingly it was concluded that the contract between the French company 
and the Ottoman Empire had been duly entered into and was therefore binding on 
Greece as the new sovereign of Crete. 
It has also been argued that the reference to "ultimate sovereignty" in article 
III refers to the fact that Cuba will "ultimately" reacquire sovereignty over 
Guantanamo on the termination of the lease but that its sovereignty is suspended 
over the term of the lease. 74 Such an argument seems flawed in at least two 
respects. 
Firstly, the term "ultimate sovereignty" in article II is used in the phrase "the 
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba". Read in this 
context, the use the word "continuance" makes it clear that Cuba's ultimate 
sovereignty over Guantanamo, which it undoubtedly had prior to the signing of 
the Lease Agreements, will continue during the term of the lease, albeit that the 
exercise of its sovereignty is drastically curtailed during this time. 
Secondly, as already discussed, continuing Cuban sovereignty is evidenced 
by the fact that the United States is restricted from undertaking certain activities 
pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreements. 
72 Lighthouses in Greece and Samas (Greece v France)(l937) PCIJ Series NB No 71, 127. 
73 Lighthouses in Greece and Samas (Greece v France), above, 103. 
74 See Joseph Lazar "International Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay'' (1968) 62 Am J lnt'l L 
730,735. See also Gherebi v Bush (2003) 352 F 3d 1278, 1293-1294 (9th Cir). 
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While the weight of authority discussed above seems to suggest that 
sovereignty of Guantanamo will remain with Cuba, the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning East Timar (Portugal v 
Australia/ 5 provides implicit support for the notion that sovereignty is not 
necessarily an indivisible concept (i.e. that a territory can potentially have more 
than one sovereign). In that case Portugal argued that Australia, by entering into 
a treaty with Indonesia regarding the delimitation of the East Timorese 
continental shelf (the "Timor Gap Treaty"), had interfered with the right of the 
East Timorese people to self determination and had improperly acknowledged 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. 
The International Court of Justice held that it was unable to consider the 
merits of Portugal's claim because Indonesia was not a party to the action. It 
considered that: "Australia's behaviour [ could not] be assessed without first 
entering into the question of why it is that Indonesia could not lawfully have 
concluded the Timor Gap Treaty".76 
The Court n9ted that East Timor continued to be self governing. However, 
arguably, by refusing to exercise jurisdiction without the presence of Indonesia, 
the Court has implicitly acknowledged Indonesia may have also acquired some 
of the sovereign rights over East Timor. 
While the East Timar case could be seen as raising the possibility that both 
the United States and Cuba are sovereign at Guantanamo it is not necessary to 
consider this further. This is because, as discussed below, the rules against 
arbitrary detention forming part of international human rights law do not tum on 
where the detained person is held but rather on the level of control exercised by 
the detaining power. 
75 Case Concerning East Timar (Portugal v Australia) (l 995) 105 ILR 226. 
76 Case Concerning East Timar (Portugal v Australia), above, 243 . 
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III INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE RULE 
AGAINST ARBITRARY DETENTION 
Freedom from arbitrary detention is a fundamental principle of the law. The 
principle has its origins in the Magna Carta, a seminal document on personal 
liberty and civil governance. In particular, Article 29 proclaims that: 77 
[n]o free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be dispossessed of his 
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed or exiled .. . but by 
lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. 
Since its affirmation in the Magna Carta, the prohibition against arbitrary 
detention has become a firmly entrenched feature of both domestic and 
international systems of law. 
At a domestic level, the rule against arbitrary detention can be seen in the 
form of the writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is an administrative 
mechanism available for securing the release of an individual who is arbitrarily 
detained. The writ requires the person responsible for the detention to produce 
the prisoner before the Court and to stipulate the legal basis for why the prisoner 
has been detained. While habeas corpus has its origins in English law it also 
forms an integral part of the United States legal system, 78 and has been described 
as one of the "cornerstones" of the great legal tradition that the two countries 
share.79 
At an international level, the rule against arbitrary detention is enshrined in 
the various conventions making up the body of international human rights law. 
International human rights law developed from the ashes of the Second 
World War, through the vehicle of the United Nations. On 10 December 1948 
the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration 
77 Magna Carta 1 Stat. at Large (Runnington rev. to Ruffbead, Charles Eyre et al, 1796), art 29. 
78 The right to habeas corpus is codified pursuant to the United States Constitution. See 28 USC §2241. 
79 Abbasi v Secretary of State (2003) 42 ILM 358, 374 (CA) . 
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of Human Rights80 which set out the fundamental rights that were attributable to 
all human beings. Article 9 of the Declaration provides that "[n]o one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile". The United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
81 (ICCPR) codifies many of 
the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained. 82 It also includes a right to habeas corpus. 
83 
The rule against arbitrary detention is also a feature of regional human rights 
systems. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights
84 
(American 
Convention) and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
85 
(American Declaration), both instruments of the Organisation of American 
States, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms86 (ECHR), an instrument of the European Union, all 
include provisions against arbitrary detention87 and giving persons detained a 
right to habeas corpus. 88 
As indicated in the first section of this paper, the Bush Administration has 
submitted that international human rights law will not apply for two reasons. 
Firstly, the Administration asserts that as those held at Guantanamo were 
detained in the course of an armed conflict, their capture and detention is 
governed by international humanitarian law, not international human rights law. 
Secondly they suggest that human rights law instruments, in particular the 
80 Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 10 December 1948) GA Res 217 A(III) UN Doc 
A/810. 
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. The 
United States ratified the ICCPR on 8 June 1992. 
82 ICCPR, art 9(1). 
83 ICCPR, art 9(4). 
84 American Convention on Human Rights (22 November 1969) 1144 UNTS 123. 
85 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) OAS Res XXX reprinted in 
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter American System OEA/Ser LV/II 82 
doc 6 rev 1 at 17 (1992) . The United States has ratified this convention. 
86 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 
November 1950) 213 UNTS 221. 
87 See American Convention, art 7(3); American Declaration, art XXV; ECHR, art 5(1). 
88 See American Convention, art 7(6); American Declaration, art XXV; ECHR, art 5(4) . 
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ICCPR, are not binding on the United States outside its own sovereign territory. 
Each of these arguments is considered below starting with the latter argument. 
A Are Human Rights Instruments binding on a State outside its own 
Sovereign Territory? 
Jurisdiction for the purposes of international human rights law is generally 
governed by the terms of the relevant convention under consideration. For 
example, article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires a member state to apply the 
treatment set out in the convention to "all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction". 
Read literally, article 2(1) arguably suggests that a State is only accountable 
for violations under the ICCPR if those violations occurred within its own 
territory. However the United Nations Human Rights Committee (the "HRC"), 
the body responsible for monitoring State compliance with the ICCPR, has given 
the article a wider interpretation, so that it will also apply to violations of the 
covenant which a state's agent commits in the territory of another state. 
In Lopez Burgos v Uruguay89 members of the Uruguayan security forces 
kidnapped a Uruguayan national living in Argentina and forcibly returned him to 
Uruguay, where he was incarcerated. Proceedings were launched against 
Uruguay for various violations of the ICCPR including the article pertaining to 
arbitrary arrest and detention. 
The HRC concluded the ICCPR would apply against Uruguay, even though 
the kidnapping and detention had not occurred on Uruguayan sovereign territory. 
It made the following statement regarding the issue of jurisdiction:90 
89 L 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant places an obligation upon a State party to 
respect and to ensure rights "to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction', but this does not imply that the State party concerned 
opez Burgos v Uruguay No 52/1979 Views of the Human Rights Committee CCPR/C/ 13/D/52/1979 (29 July 1981). 
90 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, above, para 12.3. 
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cannot be held accountable for violations of rights under the Covena
nt 
which its agents commit upon the territory of another State, whether wi
th 
the acquiescence of the Government of that State or in opposition to i
t. 
According to article 5 (1) of the Covenant: 
"l . Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for an
y 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any a
ct 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herei
n 
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the presen
t 
Covenant." 
In line with this, it would be unconscionable to so interpret th
e 
responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party t
o 
perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, whic
h 
violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory. 
An individual opinion appended to the HRC decision provided further that: 
To construe the words "within its territory" pursuant to their strict litera
l 
meaning as excluding any responsibility for conduct occurring beyond th
e 
national boundaries would, however, lead to utterly absurd results .... Neve
r 
was it envisaged ... to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power t
o 
carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and persona
l 
integrity against their citizens living abroad. Consequently, despite th
e 
wording of article 2 (1), the events which took place outside Uruguay com
e 
within the purview of the Covenant. 
The above two statements concerning jurisdiction were also included in the
 
HRC decision in Casariego v Urugua/
1
, which had similar facts to the Lopez 
Burgos decision. In that case Uruguayan authorities had entered Brazil, seize
d a 
woman and brought her back to Uruguay for criminal proceedings. The H
RC 
held that this violated the ICCPR "because the act of abduction into Urugua
yan 
territory constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention."
92 
The Inter American Commission on Human Rights, which monitors
 
compliance with the American Declaration, has made similar statements to
 the 
HRC regarding the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations. 
This 
is evidenced by the Conunission's decision in Coard v United States.
93 In that 
case, several individuals commenced proceedings against the United St
ates, 
alleging they had been arbitrarily detained in contravention of the Amer
ican 
91 Casariego v Uruguay No 56/1979 Views of the Human R
ights Committee 
CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (29 July 1981). 
92 Casariego v Uruguay, above, para 11. 
93 Coal'd v United States Case 10.951 Inter-Am CHR Report No 109/99 OENS
er L/V/II.106 doc 
6 rev (1999). 
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Declaration. The detentions were alleged to have occurred during a United 
States military incursion in Grenada. In its report the Commission endorsed the 
following principle with regard to jurisdiction:94 
Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity, 
each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person 
subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons 
within a state's territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct 
with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the 
territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state - usually 
through the acts of the latter's agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns 
not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence within a particular 
geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State 
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control. 
More recently, the Commission has reaffirmed the above principle in a letter 
to the United States requesting that precautionary measures are adopted in 
relation to the Guantanamo detainees. 95 The letter states: 
The determination of a state 's responsibility for violations of the 
international human rights of an individual turns not on the individual 's 
nationality of presence within a particular geographic area, but rather 
whether under specific circumstances, that person fell within the state 's 
authority and control. 
Article 1 of the ECHR requires States to secure the freedom and rights of 
"everyone within their jurisdiction". The European Court has traditionally 
interpreted ECHR in a similar manner to other human rights instruments such as 
the ICCPR and the American Declaration. However, as discussed below, the 
recent decision of the Court in Bankovic & Ors v Belgium96 seems to suggest that 
the ECHR has a more restricted jurisdictional scope compared to other human 
rights instruments. 
In Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain97 the applicants, who were 
Spanish and Czech citizens, brought proceedings against France and Spain 
contending that their convictions for criminal offences by courts in the 
94 Coard v United States Case 10.951 Inter-Am CHR Report No 109/99 OEA./Ser U V/II.106 doc 
6 rev (1999) , para 37. 
95 Letter oflnter-American Commission on Human Rights to the United States requesting that the 
United States take precautionary measures in respect of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay (2002) 
41 ILM 532. 
96 Bankovic & Ors v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435. 
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principality of Andorra and their subsequent imprisonment in France viola
ted 
Articles 5(1) (regarding liberty and security) and 6 (regarding the right to a 
fair 
trial). Judges from both France and Spain sat in Andorran courts, and it 
was 
claimed that this meant that France and Spain had some responsibility for 
the 
decisions that were reached. 
France and Spain raised preliminary objections to the admissibility of both
 
claims. They submitted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cl
aim 
because Andorra was not a party to the Convention. The Court noted that "[
t]he 
tenn jurisdiction is not limited to the national territory of the High Contrac
ting 
Parties; their responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authori
ties 
producing effects outside their own authority."
98 It held on the facts of the case, 
however, that there was nothing to support the view that Spanish or Fre
nch 
authorities had influenced the decision reached by the Andorran Courts. 
A similar conclusion with regard to jurisdiction was also reached in Loizidou
 
v Turkey. 99 In that case the Applicant, a Greek Cypriot who owned land
 in 
Northern Cyprus, sought redress under various articles of the ECHR when 
she 
was denied access to her land as a result of the Turkish occupation of North
ern 
Cyprus. Turkey argued the Court had no jurisdiction over the case because it
 did 
not concern acts and omissions of Turkey but those of the Turkish Republi
c of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which Turkey submitted was an independent State.
100 
The Court disagreed holding that the Applicant's loss of control over her land
 
stemmed from the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkish troops who 
had 
prevented her from gaining access to her property. In these circumstance
s it 
concluded that Article I of the Convention would apply to Turkey, even tho
ugh 
97 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 745 . 
98 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, above, 788. 
99 Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99 . 
100 The United Nations Security Council had previously issued a resolution pr
oclaiming that the 
TRNC was legally invalid and calling upon all members not to recognise an
y Cypriot state other 
than the Republic of Cyprus. See Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) 
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the acts complained of were committed outside Turkish sovereign territory. The 
Court made the following comments on the issue of jurisdiction: 101 
... the Court recalls that, although Article 1 sets limits on the reach of the 
Convention, the concept of "jurisdiction" under this provision is not 
restricted to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties. According 
to its established case law, for example, the Court has held that the 
extradition or expulsion of a person by a Contracting State may give rise to 
an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State 
under the Convention. In addition, the responsibility of Contracting Parties 
can be involved because of acts of their authorities, whether performed 
within or outside national boundaries, which produce effects outside their 
own territory. 
Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility 
of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military 
action--whether lawful or unlawful--it exercises effective control of an area 
outside its national territory. 
The decision in Bankovic & Ors v Belgium 102 resulted from the bombing by 
NATO forces of the Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) headquarters in Belgrade on 
23 April 1999. The bombing occurred as part of NATO's campaign of air strikes 
directed against the Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict. 
The Applicants, all Yugoslavian Nationals affected by the bombing, sought 
to bring proceedings against each of the NA TO states that was also a Contracting 
State to the ECHR. 103 However as Yugoslavia was not a party to the ECHR, an 
issue arose regarding whether the Applicants had standing to bring proceedings 
under the ECHR. The Court made the following statement on the issue of 
jurisdiction: 104 
As to the "ordinary meaning" of the relevant term in Article 1 of the 
Convention, the Court is satisfied that, from the standpoint of public 
international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily 
territorial. While international law does not exclude a State 's exercise of 
jurisdiction extra-territorially, the suggested bases of such jurisdiction 
(including nationality, flag , diplomatic and consular relations, effect, 
protection, passive personality and universality) are, as a general rule, 
defined and limited by the sovereign territorial rights of the other relevant 
States. 
101 Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99, 130. 
102 Bankovic & Ors v Belgium (2001) 11 BHRC 435. 
103 Those countries were: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and 
United Kingdom. 
104 Bankovic & Ors v Belg ium (2001) 11 BHRC 435 , para 59 . 
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The Court also noted, having discussed its previous decision in Loizidou, that 
the application of the ECHR extra-territorially would only be appropriate m 
. l . 10s exceptlona cucumstances: 
the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State is 
exceptional: it has done so when the respondent State, through the effective 
control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad is a consequence 
of military action or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the 
Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by that Government. 
The Court accordingly concluded that the Applicants lacked standing to bring 
a claim under the ECHR. 
The decision in Bankovic suggests that the ECHR is more restricted in 
application than many of its other international human rights counterparts. It will 
apply only in extreme circumstances where a State exercises governmental 
function over individuals extra-territorially. This would arguably suggest that if 
a case with facts similar to Lopez Burgos v Uruguay arose in a European context, 
it might not be afforded the protection of the ECHR. 
Nevertheless, if a fact situation similar to that at Guantanamo arose in a 
European context, it would seem that the ECHR could still be successfully 
invoked. As indicated above, the United States exercises complete jurisdiction 
and control at Guantanamo by virtue of the lease agreement with Cuba. It 
accordingly exercises all of the public powers normally exercised by a 
Government. That level of control would obviously also be sufficient to satisfy 
the lesser jurisdictional requirements required under the ICCPR and American 
Declaration. 
105 Bankovic & Ors v Belgium (200 I) 11 BHRC 435 , para 71 . 
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B Is the approach adopted with regard to jurisdiction under international 
human rights law consistent with the approach that the English courts 
have adopted to jurisdiction in cases on habeas corpus? 
As mentioned earlier, habeas corpus, while forming an integral part of 
international human rights law, has its origins in English common law. It is 
accordingly useful to consider whether the approach to jurisdiction adopted 
under international human rights law is consistent with the approach that the 
English courts have adopted to jurisdiction in cases on habeas corpus. 
One of the earliest cases to consider the jurisdictional ambit of habeas corpus 
was the decision of the Kings Bench in Rex v Cowle. 106 The Court was asked to 
issue a writ of certiorari to the town of Berwick to return indictments against the 
defendants. England had acquired Berwick by conquest from Scotland. 
However Berwick had not been formally incorporated within England and was 
governed by its own local charter. 
The Kings Bench held that the writs of certiorari would issue. This was 
because the level of power and control the Crown exercised over Berwick was 
sufficient to make it a dominion. Lord Mansfield CJ, in delivering the judgment 
of the Court, made the following comments regarding the jurisdiction of the 
English courts to issue prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus: 107 
Writs, not ministerially directed, (sometimes called prerogative writs, 
because they are supposed to issue on the part of the King), such as \vrits of 
mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, are restrained by no 
clause in the constitution given to Berwick: upon a proper case, they may 
issue to every dominion of the Crown of England. 
There is no doubt as to the power of this court; where the place is under the 
subjection of the Crown of England; the only question is, as to the propriety. 
To foreign dominions, which belong to a prince who succeeds to the Throne 
of England, this court has no power to send any writ of any kind. We cannot 
send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the electorate: but to Ireland, the Isle 
of Man, the Plantations, and, as since the loss of the Duchy of Normandy, 
they have been considered as annexed to the Crown, in some respects, to 
106 Rex v Cowie 2 Burr 834; 97 ER 587 (KB). 
107 Rex v Cowie, above, 599. 
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Guernsey and Jersey, we may; and formerly, it lay to Calais; which was a 
conquest, and yielded to the Crown of England by the Treaty ofBretigny. 
The Kings Bench had earlier concluded that Berwick would be a dominion of 
the Crown: 
But, if Berwick was to be deemed a dominion of the Crown, and no part of 
the realm of England; it may be under the control and superintendence of 
the King in this court. 
The constitution given to Berwick by the Crown of England, approved by 
Parliament, shows it necessarily is so; much stronger than in the case of 
counties palatine or Wales. The people of Berwick have not jura regalia, or 
a complete jurisdiction within themselves, like a county palatine: they have 
no sovereign courts of the King within themselves, like Wales. They are 
made a free borough, to hold in burgage, by rent. Such a creature of law 
must necessarily be collected, as part of a kingdom, and subordinate. 
In Ex parte Anderson
108 the petitioners applied to the Queens Bench for a 
writ of habeas corpus to be issued to the sheriff of the county of York in Canada 
and the keeper of the gaol at Toronto. This was despite the fact that Canada had 
its own local independent judicature with full power to grant the same relief. 
The petitioners argued, however, that the Crown, through the Courts at 
Westminster, had the power to issue a habeas writ to any part of the Queens 
dominions, and therefore to Canada. 
The Queens Bench reluctantly agreed with the petitioner's view that the writ 
should issue. They stated:
109 
We have considered this matter; and the result of anxious deliberations is 
that we think the writ ought to issue. At the same time, we are sensible of 
the inconvenience which may result from such a step; and that it may be felt 
to be inconsistent with that higher degree of colonial independence, both 
legislative and judicial, which happily exists in modem times. Nevertheless, 
it is to be observed that, in establishing a local judicature in Canada, our 
Legislature has not gone so far as expressly to abrogate the rights of the 
superior Courts at Westminster to issue the writ of habeas corpus to that 
province; which writ, in the absence of any prohibitive enactment, goes to 
all parts of the Queens dominions. 
The Ex parte Anderson decision provides an illustration of the broad 
territorial scope of the habeas writ and of the fact that the writ was, ignoring any 
108 Ex Parte Anderson (1861) 3 El & El 487; 121 ER 525 (QB). 
109 Ex Parle Anderson (1861) 3 El & El 487, 494-495; 121 ER 525, 527-528 (QB). 
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legislative restrictions, treated as running m any part of the colonies or 
dominions of the Crown. 
The English legislature's response to the Ex parte Anderson decision was to 
enact legislation, in the form of the Habeas Corpus Act 1862. The preamble to 
the Act stated that it was "an act respecting the issue of writs of habeas corpus 
out of England into Her Majesty's possessions abroad." Section 1 of the Act 
provided: 
No writ of habeas corpus shall issue out of England, by the authority of any 
Judge or court of justice therein, into any colony or foreign dominion of the 
Crown where Her Majesty has a lawfully established court or courts of 
justice having authority to grant and issue the writ, and to ensure the due 
execution thereof through such colony and dominion. 
The effect of the above provision was to deny colonies and foreign 
dominions access to English Courts where the Crown had already established 
courts with the ability to issue the habeas writ. However implicitly this suggests 
that where the courts in a British colony or foreign colony were unable to issue 
and enforce habeas writs the right to petition the English Courts for relief would 
be preserved. 
In R v Earl of Crewe, Ex Parte Sekgome 110 the King's Bench was required to 
consider whether a habeas writ would issue to the British Protectorate of 
Bechuanaland. Bechuanaland was not part of the Crown's territorial dominions, 
nor did the Crown enjoy any sort of sovereignty over it. The Crown did, 
however, control and administer the protectorate by virtue of a treaty. The writ 
was sought on behalf of an individual detained in the Protectorate pursuant to a 
proclamation allegedly made under powers confirmed by Order in Cow1cil made 
in accordance with the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890, on the grounds that the 
person's detention was necessary for the preservation of peace within the 
Protectorate. 
The Court of Appeal (Vaughan Williams, Farwell and Kennedy LJJ) 
dismissed the habeas petition on the basis that the Order in Council had been 
110 R v Earl of Crewe, Ex Parte Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576 (CA) . 
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validly made and hence Sekgome's detention was lawful. It was acco
rdingly not 
strictly necessary for the judges to reach concluded views on territor
ial scope of 
the habeas writ. Nevertheless, all three judges made a numbe
r of obiter 
comments regarding whether the habeas writ was limited to territorial
 dominions 
of the Crown, or conversely whether it would issue in any territory 
over which 
the Crown enjoyed a sufficient level of control. 
Kennedy LJ was of the view that the habeas writ would not issue 
beyond 
territorial dominions of the Crown. However both Vaughan W
illiams and 
Farwell LJJ disagreed. Vaughan Williams LJ stated: 
111 
The judgment of Cockburn CJ. in Ex parte Anderson makes it cle
ar that 
before the statute of 1862 the writ would have run in the colonies an
d other 
the King's territorial dominions and in countries conquered by the
 King, 
such as Calais, and could have been ordered to issue by the Court of
 King's 
Bench in England. This being so, I ask myself why, if the writ of habe
as can 
be issued to the King's territorial dominions, the writ should not be o
rdered 
to go to any country or place under the subjection of the Crown of E
ngland 
whenever it is suggested to the Court in England that a subject of the 
Crown 
is illegally imprisoned. 
The Crown, with the concurrence of Parliament, has exercised juris
diction 
throughout the Bechuanaland Protectorate and has appointed judg
es and 
police officers to execute their judgment, and has established Courts
 which 
the Crown contends, I think wrongly, have power to issue a writ of 
habeas 
and enforce it; in short, has established laws which the dwellers 
in the 
Protectorate, whether natives or mere residents, must obey, and from
 which 
they surely must be entitled to receive protection when injured. Is th
e mere 
fact of absence of annexation and theoretical possession to depri
ve the 
Crown and those who are under the law from the benefits and power
 of the 
writ of habeas? 
Similarly, Farwell LJ observed: 
112 
Where a man who owes obedience to laws imposed by Engl
and is 
imprisoned and kept imprisoned without trial in a place maintain
ed by 
England, and placed under the control of an officer of the Crown wh
o acts 
under the orders of the Colonial Office, and who has acted in the par
ticular 
case with the assent and approval of and is supported by the C
olonial 
Office, I should be slow to conclude that the Secretary of State could 
not be 
called on to make a return to the writ. 
In re Ning Yi-Ching
11 3 the Court was asked to consider whether the English 
Courts had the jurisdiction to issue a habeas writ in respect of persons 
detained in 
111 R v Earl of Crewe, Ex Parle Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576,605. 
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the British Concession at Tientsin. 114 This case is of particular significance for 
present purposes because both the British Concession at Tientsin and the United 
States Naval Base at Guantanamo were acquired pursuant to lease. 
The Tientsin lease gave the British certain rights of administration and 
control in respect of the Tientsin Concession. These included allowing the 
British to maintain a British Supreme Court in Tientsin. The British were also 
given jurisdiction over their own subjects within the Tientsin concession but not 
over other nationalities or other Chinese subjects who committed offences 
against British subjects. 
In 1939 four Chinese subjects were detained by the British authorities in the 
Tientsin Concession on certain criminal charges. They were placed in a British-
run gaol within the Concession with a view to being handed over to the local 
district court for prosecution. A writ of habeas corpus was sought on behalf of 
the detained men. It was directed to the British Foreign Secretary and to certain 
officials at Tientsin. 
Cassels Jin the Vacation Court held, however, that the writ would not issue 
for want of jurisdiction. The Judge was reported as follows: 11 5 
He had listened in vain for a case in which the writ of habeas corpus had 
issued in respect of a foreigner in a part of the world which was not part of 
the King ' s dominions or realm. In Tientsin Britain had merely acquired a 
lease of land and had been granted by treaty the right to administer justice to 
its own subjects. He was compelled to hold that in the circumstances of the 
present case the writ could not issue. 
It has been argued that the decision in re Ning Yi-Ching was incorrectly 
decided. This view stems from the fact that Cassels J seemed to be influenced by 
the view advanced by Kennedy LJ in Ex Parle Sekgome that habeas would not 
11 2 R v Earl of Crewe, Ex Parle Sekgome [1910] 2 KB 576 (CA), 618 . 
11 3 re Ning Yi-Ching (1939) 56 TLR 3 (Vac Ct). 
114 Tienstin is located 100 km south-east of Beijing and 50 km inland of the yellow sea and is 
now the third largest city in China. See David Clark & Gerard McCoy The Most Fundamental 
Legal Right: Habeas Corpus in the Commonwealth (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000) 
151. 
11 5 re Ning Yi-Ching (1939) 56 TLR 3, 6 (Vac Ct). 
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issue beyond territorial dominions of the Crown. As noted above, however, 
Kennedy LJ was in the minority on that issue; both Vaughan Williams and 
Farwell LJJ reached the opposite conclusion. 
In any event, the re Ning Yi-Ching decision appears distinguishable on its 
facts from the situation at Guantanamo. Under the Tienstin lease the British only 
acquired limited sovereign rights regarding the administration of justice over its 
own nationals within the leased area. In contrast, as previously noted, the United 
States exercises complete jurisdiction at Guantanamo and has the right to 
administer justice in respect of all persons at Guantanamo, regardless of 
nationality. 
In Ex Parte Mwyena
116 the English Court of Appeal was asked to consider 
whether the habeas writ would issue to the British Protectorate of Northern 
Rhodesia. As was the case with the Bechuanaland Protectorate in Ex Parte 
Sekgome, Northern Rhodesia was not a territorial dominion of the Crown but the 
Crown, nevertheless, had control and jurisdiction over the Protectorate by virtue 
of a treaty. 
The crown contended that English Courts only had jurisdiction to issue 
habeas writs to territorial dominions of the Crown, and consequently not to 
Northern Rhodesia. This contention was unanimously rejected by the English 
Court of Appeal (Lord Evershed MR, Romer and Sellers LJJ) who concluded 
that the writ would issue to any place under the subjection of the crown, 
including Northern Rhodesia. Lord Evershed MR stated: 
117 
... But, as it seems to me, if upon a proper investigation of the facts, it 
appears that the internal governance of Northern Rhodesia is in legal effect 
indistinguishable from that of a British colony or a country acquired by 
conquest, then, in conformity with the nature of the writ as expounded by 
the learned authors to whom I have referred, Bacon, Blackstone, Coke, 
Mansfield, I see for my part no reason for denying jurisdiction to the court. 
jurisdiction ought not be limited to territories outside England, which are 
strictly labelled "colonies or foreign dominions," but will extend to 
116 Ex Parte Mwyena [1960] 1 QB 241. 
111 Ex Parle Mwyena [1960] I QB 241,303. 
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territories which, having regard to the extent of the dominion in fact 
exercised, can be said to be "under the subjection of the Crown" and in 
which the issue of a writ will be regarded (In Lord Mansfield's words) as 
"proper and efficient". In other words I would hold that we ought not in this 
case to lay it down, in disregard ( as it seems to me) of what has been said by 
the highest authorities, that the jurisdiction is limited to colonies and foreign 
dominions strictly so called ... 
In a similar vein Sellers LJ noted: 11 8 
The submission of the Attorney-General and Mr. Cumming-Bruce was that 
there was a strict territorial boundary which was conclusive as to the scope 
of the writ. 
If this restriction had throughout history always been the confines of 
England and the normal territorial boundaries of the court, the argument 
would have been compelling. But once the writ has gone beyond our shores. 
as it has, and outside the normal jurisdiction of the court, why should the 
writ be limited by territorial boundaries? The writ is concerned with 
personal freedom and the emphasis in principle, it would seem, is not on 
where the wrongful detention is occurring but, assuming the court is 
satisfied that the detention is without justification whether it can, having 
regard to the proper interests, rights and powers of those governing the place 
of detention, make an order which can be enforced and so release an 
applicant who has asked for justice before it. 
The above cases provide evidence, that as a matter of English law, 
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief will exist whenever an individual is detained in 
territory over which the Crown exercises a sufficient level of authority and 
control. Whether the Crown exercises technical sovereignty over the territory is 
irrelevant. The approach to jurisdiction under English common law is therefore 
entirely consistent with the approach adopted under international human rights 
law. 
Accordingly, it would appear that international human rights law should 
apply in respect of the detainees at Guantanamo since they are under the 
complete authority and control of the United States. The Bush Administration 
disputes this, however, contending that because the detainees were captured as 
part of an armed conflict, international human rights law will not apply. This 
argument is considered below. 
118 Ex Parle Mwyena [1960] I QB 241, 309. 
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C Does International Human Rights Law Appl
y in Times of Emergency 
or War? 
In times of war and emergency the executive assum
es power to restrict 
personal freedom in the name of security. The role
 of the courts consequently 
becomes particularly important since they stand be
tween the government and 
individuals. However, historically, domestic court
s have "played a less than 
glorious" role in times of crisis, on account of the
ir tendency to defer to the 
executive on matters of discretion.
119 
A classic example of this tendency comes from the d
ecision of the House of 
Lords in Liversidge v Anderson.
120 In that case a person was detained pursuant 
to a defence regulation which provided that the Ho
me Secretary could order a 
detention "if he has reasonable cause to believe" 
the person to be of hostile 
origins or associations. The detainee sought habeas
 relief on the grounds that, 
objectively, the Home Secretary did not have reasona
ble cause for the detention. 
Lord Atkin endorsed an objective interpretation of t
he provision: the Home 
Secretary needed to have reasonable grounds for th
e detention. He noted that 
"amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent"
121 and cautioned that judges 
should not when facing "claims involving the li
berty of the subject show 
themselves more executive minded than the executi
ve". 122 Unfortunately Lord 
Atkin's colleagues, who formed the majority, d
isagreed holding that the 
application of the provision only required the Home
 Secretary to think he had 
reasonable grounds for the detention. Thus the decis
ion precluded virtually any 
review of the Home Secretary's discretion to detain. 
Subsequent decisions of the 
House of Lords have, however, endorsed Lord Atkin'
s view. 123 
119 Lord Steyn "Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hol
e" (27th FA Mann Lecture, London, 25 
November 2003). 
120 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 (HL). See a
lso Greene v The Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs [1942] AC 284 (HL). 
121 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206, 244 (HL). 
122 Liversidge v Anderson, above, 244. 
123 See Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [1951] AC 66. Similarl
y, Lord Reid has described Liversidge as 
a "very peculiar decision". See Ridge v Baldwin [196
4] AC 40, 71 (HL). 
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The historical trend of deferring to the executive m times of emergency 
extends to both sides of the Atlantic. In Korematsu v United States 124 the 
petitioner was arrested for being in a place from which all persons of Japanese 
ancestry were excluded pursuant to a military order. The petitioner, who was 
born in the United States but of Japanese descent, sought to challenge the 
constitutionality of that order on the basis that it amounted to discrimination on 
the basis of race. 
The Supreme Court held that, while "legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect", 125 the order was not 
unconstitutional. Justice Black who delivered the majority judgrnent stated: 126 
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the 
real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue . . . 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese 
Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security 
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
Coast temporarily, and finally , because Congress, reposing its confidence in 
this time of war in our military leaders--as inevitably it must-- determined 
that they should have the power to do just this. There was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that the 
need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot--by availing 
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight--now say that at that time 
these actions were unjustified. 
The conviction received by the petitioner was subsequently overturned in 
1984 on the basis that the government had withheld infonnation from the courts 
when they were considering the critical question of military necessity. 127 
Unlike the availability of habeas corpus under domestic law, which can be 
limited by domestic legislation, the availability of habeas corpus under 
internat_ional human rights law will be detennined by the particular human rights 
body charged with the administration of the convention under consideration. A 
124 Korematsu v United States (1942) 323 US 214. 
125 Korematsu v United States, above, 223-224. 
126 Korematsu v United States, above, 216. 
127 See Korematsu v United States (1984) 584 F Supp 1406 (ND Cal). 
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discussion of the approaches that the major human rights bodie
s have adopted on 
the issue of habeas corpus in emergency situations, follows. 
Article 4(1) of the ICCPR allows states to derogate from 
certain rights 
contained in the convention, but only in strictly defined circu
mstances. 
128 For 
derogation to be possible two conditions must be met: there m
ust be a situation 
which amounts to a public emergency that threatens the life of t
he nation, and the 
state party must have officially proclaimed that a state of emerg
ency exists.
129 In 
addition, pursuant to article 4(2) certain rights are deemed to be
 non-derogable in 
any circumstances. These include the right to life, the right a
gainst torture, the 
right against slavery, and the right to freedom of thought
, conscience and 
religion. 
The HRC has issued a detailed General Comment on the 
application of 
Article 4. The General Comment notes that states may in no cir
cumstance: 1
30 
invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for acting in
 violation of 
humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, fo
r instance by 
taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, throu
gh arbitrary 
deprivations of liberty or by deviating from principles of fair tr
ial, including 
the presumption of innocence. 
In addition the HRC has said that:
131 
[i]n order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take 
proceedings 
before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on th
e lawfulness 
of detention, must not be diminished by a State party's decisio
n to derogate 
from the Covenant. 
Read together, these comments suggest that even in a state 
of emergency 
habeas corpus will be available, as it provides a necessary 
safeguard against 
abuse of the non-derogable rights set out in Article 4(2) of the c
onvention. 
128 Millian Sequeira v Uruguay CCPR/c/10//d/6/1977 (1980) para 
14. 
129 ICCPR, art 4(1). 
130 
Human Rights Committee "General Comment No 29 States o
f Emergency (article 4)" UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 11 (2001), para 11 (emphasis adde
d). 
131 
Human Rights Committee "General Comment No 29 States o
f Emergency (article 4)" UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev I/Add 11 (2001). 
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded similarly in an 
Advisory Opinion on whether the right to habeas corpus under the American 
Convention on Human Rights can be suspended in times of emergency. 132 The 
Court stated that habeas corpus could not be suspended in any circumstances 
because it was a "judicial guarantee essential for the protection of certain non-
derogable rights set out in the Convention." 133 
The Inter American Commission on Human Rights has also taken the view 
that habeas corpus is non-derogable. For instance in Coard v United States the 
Commission noted that: 134 
Supervisory control over a detention is an essential safeguard, because it 
provides effective assurance that the detainee is not exclusively at the mercy 
of the detaining authority. This is an essential rationale of the right of 
habeas corpus, a protection which is not susceptible to abrogation. 
Based on the above, it appears that habeas corpus, for the purposes of 
international human rights law, is a fundamental , largely non-derogable, right for 
the purposes of international human rights law which applies equally in times of 
peace and times of emergency. This arguably suggests that the Guantanamo 
detainees should be entitled to some level of protection, under international 
human rights law; including protection from arbitrary detention. 
The United States has, of course, challenged this conclusion asserting that 
only international humanitarian law applies with respect to the situation at 
Guantanamo. The applicability of international humanitarian law is considered 
below. 
132 Inter-American Court of Human Rights "Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations" Advisory 
Opinion OC-8/87 (30 January 1987). It should be noted that the United States has never become 
a party to the American Convention. It nevertheless provides further support for the view that for 
the purposes if International Human Rights law, the right of habeas corpus cannot be suspended. 
OAS can advise 
133 Inter-American Court of Human Rights "Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations" Advisory 
Opinion OC-8/87 (30 January 1987), art 23. 
134 Coard v United States Case 10.95 1 Inter-Am CHR Report No 109/99 OEA/Ser UV/II.106 doc 
6 rev (1999), para 55 (emphasis added). 
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IV HUMANITARIAN LAW 
The law of war, also known as the law of armed conflict or humanitarian law
, 
is a branch of international law which has evolved through centuries of effo
rts to 
mitigate the harmful effects of war. Recognising the impossibility of elimin
ating 
warfare altogether, states have agreed to abide by rules limiting their condu
ct, in 
return for the enemy's agreement to abide by the same rules.
135 
The laws of war can be divided into two subsets. The first subset is made u
p 
of the laws of engagement during times of conflict and is based on the key t
enets 
of military necessity and proportionality. 
136 The second subset is made up of 
laws relating to the treatment of prisoners captured in the course of war.
137 For 
present purposes only this latter subset is of relevance. 
Today's humanitarian law is the product of a long period of evolution
. 
Originally p1isoners of war ("POW's") were the object of their captor's mer
cy or 
cruelty. A conquering state did what it wanted with its prisoners and answer
ed to 
nobody for its decisions. 
138 By the eighteenth century, however, it came to be 
accepted that captivity was essentially a device to prevent a POW from retu
rning 
to the war, and further, that a POW "was not a criminal but a man pursuin
g an 
honourable calling who had had the misfortune to be captured."
139 By the early 
twentieth century the key principles of humanitarian law had begun t
o be 
codified: first through the Hague Regulations, then through the Ge
neva 
Convention of 1929 and finally through the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949. 
The latter four conventions form the basis of international humanitarian
 law 
today. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide a comprehensive code for th
e 
treatment of detainees in an armed conflict. The four conventions pro
vide 
135 Jennifer Elsea "Treatment of Battlefield Detainees in the War on Terrorism"
 (I I April 2002) 
Congressional Research Service, 6. 
136 Elsea, above, 6. 
137 Elsea, above, 6. 
138 G Draper "The Geneva Conventions of 1949" (1965 I) 114 Recueil Des Cors 
64, 101. 
139 Draper, above, 101. 
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protections for four different classes of people: the military wounded and sick in 
land conflicts; the military wounded, sick and shipwrecked in conflicts at sea; 
military persons and civilians accompanying the armed forces in the field who 
are captured and qualify as prisoners of war (the "POW Convention"); and 
civilian non-combatants who are interned or otherwise found in the hands of a 
party ( e.g. in a military occupation) during an armed conflict. 
As indicated in the first section of this paper, the Bush Administration has 
contended that neither Taliban nor Al Qaeda detainees qualify for POW status 
under the POW Convention. The rationale for the Administration's view was set 
out in a Fact Sheet released by the White House on 7 February 2002. The Fact 
Sheet stated: 140 
• Al-Qaida is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a 
foreign terrorist group. As such, its members are not entitled to 
POW status. 
• Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate 
Afghan government, Afghanistan is a party to the Convention, 
and the President has determined that the Taliban are covered 
by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva 
Convention, however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as 
POWs. 
The position adopted by the United States, regarding the operation of the 
POW Convention, gives rise to a number of issues including: when the 
Convention will apply, what is meant by the term "prisoners of war" and what 
mechanisms are available for determining whether an individual qualifies as a 
POW. Each of these issues is considered below together with the residual rights 
that the detainees will have under humanitarian law if the POW Convention does 
not apply. 
140 See Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (7 February 2002) available at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-l 3.html> (last accessed 27 
February 2004). 
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A When will the POW Convention be applicable? 
All four Geneva Conventions share an identical article 2. The first paragraph 
of that article sets out when each convention will apply. It provides: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them. 
Thus applicability of each convention will tum on whether there is a declared 
"war or other armed conflict" which has arisen between two or more "High 
Contracting Parties". 
"War" has traditionally been defined as a contention between two or more 
states through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and 
imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases. 
141 Central to the concept 
of war is the premise that it must be between states. For example, one treatise 
has observed that: 
142 
To be war, the contention must be between States .. . A contention may, of 
course, arise between the armed forces of a State and a body of armed 
individuals, but this is not a war. 
The Bush Administration has repeatedly made the assertion that the United 
States is conducting a war against terror, and more particularly, the Al Qaeda 
terrorist network.
143 For example, in his 2004 State of the Union Address the 
President stated that: 
144 
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They 
view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law 
enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first 
attacked in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted, 
and sent to prison. But the matter was not settled. The terrorists were still 
141 H Lautertpacht (ed) Oppenheims International Law: A Treatise (Volume II: Disputes W
ar and 
Neutrality) (7 ed, Longmans, London, 1963), 202 . 
142 Lautertpacht, above 203 (emphasis in the original). See also Jordon J Paust "War and
 Enemy 
Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War" (2003) 28 Yale LJ 325. 
143 See for example: The State of the Union Address (20 January 2004) availa
ble at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01 /20040120-7 .html. 
144 
State of the Union Address (20 January 2004) Available at <http://www.whitehouse.go
v/news 
/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html> (last accessed 1 March 2004) 
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training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up more ambitious plans. 
After the chaos and carnage of September the 11 th, it is not enough to serve 
our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared 
war on the United States, and war is what they got. 
However the "war against terror" would not appear to constitute a "war" for 
the purposes of international law since it lacks the essential requirement of being 
a contention between states. Al Qaeda is a clandestine organisation, consisting 
of elements in many countries composed of people of various nationalities. It is 
dedicated to the advancement of certain political and religious agendas by 
committing terrorist acts directed against the United States and other western 
nations. 145 As such, it does not constitute a State, is not a subject of international 
law, and lacks an international legal personality. 146 
Moreover, Al Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to the Geneva 
Conventions and nor could it ever be. The POW Convention would 
consequently not be applicable in respect of the Al Qaeda terrorist network itself; 
although, as discussed below, individual members of Al Qaeda might arguably 
be able to rely on the Convention depending on the circumstances surrounding 
their capture. 
The applicability of the POW convention to the Taliban is more straight-
forward. The United States military actions in Afghanistan occurred after the 
Taliban, as Afghanistan's effective government, refused to expel the Al Qaeda 
network and instead provided them with sanctuary. 147 Consequently the United 
States' military action against the Taliban would appear to constitute a "war" for 
the purposes of international law, being a contention between the governments of 
the United States and Afghanistan. Moreover since both the United States and 
Afghanistan are High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions it would 
appear that the POW Convention should apply in respect of the Taliban 
detainees. 
145 George H Aldrich "The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants" 
(2002) 96 Am J Int'l L 891,893. 
146 Aldrich, above, 893. 
147 Aldrich, above, 893. 
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However whether the Taliban detainees are entitled to the protections set out 
m the Convention will depend on whether they can be categorised as being 
"prisoners of war". That issue is considered below. 
B "Prisoners of War" 
POW's enjoy a privileged status under international law. There are a number 
of advantages which flow from POW status including the right to humane 
treatment, 148 the obligation to furnish only very limited information to the 
detaining power, 149 the right to be accommodated in accommodation of the same 
standard as that enjoyed by members of the detaining power in the same area
150 
and the right to be released from captivity, without delay, on the cessation of 
hostilities. 151 However the key advantage is that of combat immunity. A 
detainee cannot be prosecuted for any lawful belligerent acts that he or she 
committed during the course of armed conflicts against legitimate military 
targets. 152 
Article 4 defines the meaning of the term "prisoners of war" for the purposes 
of the POW convention. Subparagraphs 4A(l) and 4A(2) provide that the term 
"prisoners of war" will include: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a 
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, 
148 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 
75 UNTS 
135, art 13 . 
149 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 
75 UNTS 
135, art 17. Pursuant to article 17 a POW is only obliged to give his or her surname
, first names 
and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number or failing th
is equivalent 
information. Moreover, all forms of coercion to elicit other information are expressly
 prohibited. 
150 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, above, art 25. 
15 1 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War , above, art 118. 
152 Article 87 of the POW convention provides that combatants "may not be sentenced 
.. . to any 
penalties except those provided for in respect of members of the armed forces of the
 said Power 
who have committed the same acts ." To similar effect article 99 states that "[n]o pri
soner of war 
may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaini
ng Power or 
by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed." Read tog
ether, these 
articles indicate that a State in a war cannot prosecute the soldiers of its foes for 
the soldiers' 
lawful acts of war. 
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even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or 
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, 
fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war. 
The United States has asserted that Taliban detainees do not qualify for POW 
status under the POW convention. The White House Press Secretary has offered 
the following justification for this stance: 153 
Under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, however, Taliban detainees are 
not entitled to POW status. To qualify as POWs under Article 4, Al Qaeda 
and Taliban detainees would have to have satisfied four conditions: They 
would have to be part of a military hierarchy; they would have to have worn 
uniforms or other distinctive signs visible at a distance; they would have to 
have carried arms openly; and they would have to have conducted their 
military operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 
The Taliban have not effectively distinguished themselves from the civilian 
population of Afghanistan. Moreover, they have not conducted their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Instead, they 
have knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist 
objectives of the al Qaeda. 
There are, of course, obvious strategic advantages to the United States which 
flow from the denial of POW status to the Guantanamo detainees. In particular, 
the granting of POW status would have the potential to severely curtail the 
effectiveness of interrogations carried out by the US on detainees at 
Guantanamo. As indicated above, article 17 only obliges prisoners to give a few 
personal facts such as name, rank and serial number. 
However the requirements referred to by the Press Secretary, of having a 
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and conducting operations in 
accordance with the laws of war, are only explicit features of article 4A(2). 
Pursuant to article 4A(l), all that must be shown is that the detainees are 
members of the "armed forces" of a party to the conflict ( or of militia or 
153 Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (7 May 2003). Available at 
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html> (last accessed 31 January 
2004). 
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volunteer corps forming part of those armed forces). Accordingly, based on a 
purely literal interpretation of article 4A(l) Taliban troops, as members of the 
armed forces of the effective government of Afghanistan would, prima facie, 
appear to qualify for POW status. 
Arguments have been raised, however, that article 4A(l) should be 
augmented by the four requirements set out in article 4A(2) as these requirements 
are inherent requirements of any States' armed forces.
154 Indeed the official 
commentary on article 4 provides implicit support for this proposition. In the 
context of its discussion of paragraph 4A(l) it provides the following explanation 
regarding why the paragraph does not specify any sign which members of armed 
forces must have for recognition:
155 
The drafters of the 1949 Convention, like those of the Hague Convention, 
considered that it was unnecessary to specify the sign which members of 
armed forces should have for purposes of recognition. It is the duty of each 
State to take steps so that members of its anned forces can be immediately 
recognized as such and to see to it that they are easily distinguishable from 
members of the enemy armed forces or from civilians. 
Thus the commentary appears to take the view that there was no need to 
explicitly specify signs for armed forces, as there was already an obligation for a 
state to ensure that its armed forces are distinguishable from its civilians. 
The applicability of the POW convention to members of the Taliban has also 
received judicial consideration by the United States District Court in United 
States v Lindh.
156 In that case the defendant, a United States citizen who was a 
member of the Taliban, sought to invoke the POW convention to defend charges 
of conspiring to murder nationals of the United States. The Court held that a 
member of the Taliban could not qualify as a lawful combatant under the POW 
convention because the Taliban did not meet the four criteria contained in article 
154 See for example: Ruth Wedgwood "Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commission
s" (2002) 
96 Am J Int'l L 328,335. 
155 ICRC Commentary on the Geneva Convention relative to Prisoners of War <http
: //www. 
icrc.org/ihl .nsf/W ebCOMAR T?Open View&Start= 1 &Count= l 50&Expand=3#3> (last acc
essed 4 
March 2004). 
156 United States v Lindh (2002) 212 F Supp 2d 541 (ED Va). 
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4A(2).
157 
The court made no reference to the potential applicability of article 
4A(l). 
It has been said that the four requirements specified in article 4A(2) are 
reflective of customary international law in defining the characteristics of any 
lawful armed force. 158 However it seems counter-intuitive to contend that 
Taliban troops, although fighting on behalf of the effective government of 
Afghanistan at the time of the United States intervention, are unable to be 
regarded as being members of the Afghan armed forces. 159 Moreover it is 
arguable that the government of Afghanistan has the right, as a sovereign nation, 
to determine how its armed forces should be run in any event. 160 
Even though the Al Qaeda terrorist network could never be a party to the 
POW convention per se, arguments can nevertheless be made that its members 
might qualify for POW status. For example, it has been reported that at least one 
Al Qaeda battalion was incorporated into the Taliban combat forces. 161 It 
accordingly might be argued that members of that battalion, by virtue of their 
close relationship with Taliban forces, constituted part of the "armed forces" of 
Afghanistan and should consequently be accorded POW status pursuant to article 
4A(l). 
Similarly, even if Al Qaeda is not part of the "armed forces" of Afghanistan 
its members could still qualify as POW s under article 4A(2) if they could be said 
to "belong to" a party to the conflict (i.e. Afghanistan) and meet the other criteria 
set out in that article. The United States has asserted, however, that Al Qaeda 
157 United States v Lindh, above 558. 
158 United States v Lindh, above. 
159 It is also noteworthy that historically, the most important consideration given to POW status 
has been whether there is evidence that the prisoner(s) serve a government or political entity that 
exercises authority over them. See Jennifer Elsea "Treatment of Battlefield Detainees in the War 
on Terrorism" (11 April 2002) Congressional Research Service 22. 
160 Lawrence Azubuike "Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint" (2003) 19 
Connecticut Journal oflnternational Law 127,147. 
161 Douglass Cassel "What defines a POW? It's not an easy call" (3 Febrnary 2002) Chicago 
Tribune Chicago C 1. 
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has not acted in accordance with the laws of war.
162 If this assertion is accepted 
then article 4A(2) will not apply to Al Qaeda forces, since it only applies where 
the relevant party has operated in accordance with the laws of war. 
C Article Five Tribunals 
In cases of doubt regarding whether a prisoner is entitled to POW status, 
article 5 of the POW Convention provides that the prisoner shall enjoy the 
protections afforded therein until the prisoner's status is determined by a 
"competent tribunal". 1
63 The Convention makes no attempt to define such a 
tribunal. 
To date, no "competent tribunal" has ever been convened by the US to 
consider whether any of the Guantanamo detainees might qualify for POW 
status. The US has offered the following rationale for not convening tribunals: 
164 
Members of the Taliban and al Qaida detained at Guantanamo are not 
entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Third Geneva Convention, and 
there is no need to convene an Article 5 tribunal to make individualized 
status determinations. Article 5 does not require a party to the Geneva 
Convention to convene tribunals to consider status determinations unless 
there is doubt. For members of al Qaida and the Taliban, captured while 
engaged in ongoing hostilities or directly supporting hostile operations, 
there is no doubt about their status. Article 5 states that "[s]hould any doubt 
arise," detainees "shall enjoy the protection of the [Geneva Convention] 
until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." 
Essentially the US has argued that the obligation to convene a tribunal only 
arises where there is doubt regarding a prisoner's status and that there is no doubt 
regarding the status of those detained at Guantanamo; they are all "enemy 
162 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (2 April 2003). Available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/9al4ba739a04fb2fcl256d050035483c?Opendocument> (last 
accessed 22 February 2004). 
163 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 
135, artS . 
164 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (2 April 2003) <http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/ 
Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/9a l 4ba739a04 fb2fc l 256d050035483c?Opendocument> (last accessed 
22 February 2004) . 
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combatants". However this argument appears difficult to accept for a host of 
reasons. 
First and foremost, it appears likely that a number of those detained at 
Guantanamo have no connection with either the Taliban or al Qaeda. Indeed one 
military official at Guantanamo has been reported as saying that some of the 
detainees were victims of circumstance and probably innocent. 165 There have 
also been reports of detainees who were the victims of bounty hunters, who were 
paid in dollars after abducting "terrorists" and denouncing them to the US 
military. 166 Other detainees were arrested after getting into land disputes. 167 
One of the reasons that the US have contended that the Taliban detainees do 
not qualify for POW is because they have failed to distinguish themselves from 
the civilian population of Afghanistan. However given the US assertion that the 
Taliban were not distinguishable from the general civilian population of 
Afghanistan there must surely be a possibility that some of those detained were 
simply civilians who were caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
In addition, as discussed earlier, there appears to be some doubt regarding 
correct interpretation of article 4(1)(A) of the POW convention. Such doubts 
would obviously need to be resolved before it would be possible to make a 
definitive determination regarding whether detainees would qualify for POW 
status. 
Against this background, the failure of United States to convene an article 5 
tribunal raises grave concerns under humanitarian law and suggests that at least 
165 Katharine Q Seelye "A Nation Challenged: Captives; An Uneasy Routine at Cuba Prison 
Camp (16 March 2002) The New York Times New York A8. Similarly, it has been reported that 
64 detainees innocent of any terrorist connection have already been released from Guantanamo 
with authorities admitting there may be many more to come. See David Rose "Operation Take 
away my Freedom: Inside Guantanamo Bay'' (January 2004) Vanity Fair New York 58, 60. 
166 David Rose "Operation Take away my Freedom: Inside Guantanamo Bay" (January 2004) 
Vanity Fair New York 88. 
167 David Rose "Operation Take away my Freedom: Inside Guantanamo Bay" (January 2004) 
Vanity Fair New York 88 . 
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some of those at Guantanamo should be granted POW status until their status has 
been determined by a "competent tribunal". 
D Other protections available under the Geneva system 
Where a detainee fails to qualify as a POW under the POW convention, they 
will generally be protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention (the "Civilian 
Convention"). The Civilian Convention provides protections similar to those set 
out in the POW Convention. However there is one important difference. 
Civilians who participate in conflict are not entitled to combat immunity and 
therefore are able to be held legally accountable for any belligerent acts they 
have committed. Traditionally such a person has been regarded as an ''unlawful 
combatant". 168 
The prosecution of unlawful combatants is dealt with according to the laws of 
the criminal jurisdiction in which the acts occurred. 169 The accused is entitled to 
a number of trial rights as set out in the Convention. These include the right to a 
regular trial,170 the right to counsel of the accused's choice who must be allowed 
free access to the accused and provided with all of the necessary facilities for 
preparing a defence, 171 the right to call witnesses 172 and the right of appeal to the 
extent that this is provided for by the laws applied by the court. 173 
Individuals to whom the civilian convention applies are referred to as 
"protected persons". The meaning of that term is defined in article 4 to include: 
those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the 
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals. 
168 Jennifer Elsea "Treatment of Battlefield Detainees in the War on Terrorism" (11 April 2002) 
Congressional Research Service 11. 
169 Jennifer Elsea "Treatment of Battlefield Detainees in the War on Terrorism" (11 April 2002) 
Congressional Research Service 11. 
170 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 
UNTS 287, art 71. 
171 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War, above, art 72. 
172 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War, above, art 72 
173 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War, above, art 73. 
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However paragraph two of article 4 excludes from this definition nationals of 
a co belligerent state, together with nationals of neutral states in the home 
territory of a party to the conflict, as long as such states have normal diplomatic 
relations with the detaining power. Accordingly, article four would only appear 
to have limited application in respect of the Guantanamo detainees who were 
detained in Afghanistan. While it would appear to apply in respect of Afghan 
nationals, a number of foreign nationals were also detained in Afghanistan. 
Those foreign nationals would not constitute "protected persons" for the 
purposes of the convention unless their country did not have normal diplomatic 
relations with the US. 
Where a person falls outside the categories of persons protected by the 
Geneva Conventions they may still be protected pursuant to article 75 of the 
terms of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, to the extent 
that its contents form part of customary international law. 174 Article 75 is 
intended to be a residual provision applying to all persons who are detained in 
the course of a conflict who do not receive greater protections under other 
provisions of international law. 
Many of the provisions of article 75 are pertinent. Article 75(2) prevents 
torture and other outrages to personal dignity. Article 75(3) requires that the 
detaining party informs the prisoner of the reasons for the detention and that the 
prisoner is released when the circumstances justifying the detention cease to 
exist. Article 75(4) provides that no sentence may be passed except pursuant to a 
conviction pronounced by "an impartial and regularly constituted court 
respecting the internationally recognized principles of regular judicial 
procedure". Therefore, at the very least, the detainees should be entitled to these 
minimum protections under international law. 
174 The US has not ratified this protocol but it is generally thought to reflect customary 
international law which would hence be binding on the United States. See Lord Steyn 
"Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole" (27th FA Mann Lecture, London, 25 November 
2003). Indeed in deciding not to ratify the protocol the United States had already been advised 
that it reflected customary international law. See Theodor Meron Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Norms of Customary Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) 62-69. 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
Over two years have passed since the opening of the Guantanamo detention 
facility and the detainees still find themselves incarcerated, without rights, in 
connection with a "war" of an indetenninate duration, which the Bush 
Administration has conceded "may not end with anything as clear-cut as a 
surrender ceremony on the USS Missouri."175 
The Administration has invoked humanitarian law as justification for the 
continued detention of those at Guantanamo. However, as discussed above, a 
"war on terror" does not appear to constitute a war to which humanitarian law 
would apply, at least as traditionally understood, given that it is not fought 
between states. There was, of course, a conflict between the United States and 
Afghanistan, when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, which would appear to fit 
within the traditional definition of a "war". However that conflict has long since 
ended, the Taliban have been driven from power and a new Afghan government 
has been installed. 
The Administration continues to deny that Taliban soldiers detained during 
the Afghan conflict are entitled to prisoner of war status, despite the fact that 
they were fighting on behalf of the effective government of Afghanistan at the 
time of their capture. Moreover they refuse to convene any sort of competent 
tribunal to assess whether any of those detained at Guantanamo should qualify 
for POW status. The Administration's refusal to convene individualised status 
hearings is particularly concerning since, as previously discussed, there seems to 
be a reasonable likelihood that some of the detainees may simply be innocent 
victims of circumstance, without connection to either the Taliban or Al Qaeda. 
The United States has sought to avoid the rules against arbitrary detention set 
out in various human rights instruments by asserting that the detainees are enemy 
175 Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks to the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce (13 February 
2004). Available at <http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr200402l3-0445.html> (last accessed 
28 February 2004). 
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combatants captured as part of the war on terror, and that therefore their 
treatment is governed by humanitarian, rather than human rights, law. However, 
as already discussed, international human rights law instruments generally 
continue to apply in war as they do in peace. Indeed certain rights are considered 
so fundamental that they are unable to be derogated from in any situation. A 
continuing right to habeas corpus in times of war has been regarded as being 
essential as it ensures that fundamental human rights are not being abused. 
The United States has also suggested that international human rights 
instruments, such as the ICCPR, only apply to it within its own sovereign 
territory. The analysis conducted above tends to suggest, on balance, that 
Guantanamo constitutes Cuban, rather than United States, sovereign territory. 
However, as also noted above, human rights instruments apply to all persons 
subject to a state's authority and control irrespective of the actual location of the 
detention. 
The United States Defense Secretary has recently noted that those at 
Guantanamo are enemy combatants and terrorists, being detained for acts of war 
against the United States and consequently "different rules have to apply."176 
However it is difficult to see what rules actually do apply at Guantanamo since 
the stance the United States has adopted, effectively allows it to operate free 
from all legal constraint. 
There are a number of implications for the future of international law which 
flow from the stance the United States has adopted at Guantanamo. 
Firstly, with respect to international human rights law, it is noteworthy that 
many nations have used the Guantanamo situation and the war on terror, to 
justify their own policies which curtail human rights. 177 For example, Egypt 
recently extended an emergency law which allows it to detain individuals, who 
176 Secretary Rumsfeld Remarks to the Greater Miami Chamber of Conunerce (13 February 
2004). Available at <http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2004/tr200402l3-0445 .html> (last accessed 
28 February 2004) . 
177 Lord Steyn "Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole" (27th FA Mann Lecture, London, 25 
November 2003). 
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are suspected national security threats, almost indefinitely without charge. 178 
The Egyptian President announced that America's parallel policies proved that 
"we were right from the beginning in using all means, including military 
tribunals, to combat terrorism." 179 Similarly, the Australian Government has 
enacted legislation allowing it to forcibly remove, refugees seeking asylum in 
Australia, to detention facilities in Nauru. The Australian Defence Minister 
indicated that the legislation was necessary to ensure that Australia did not 
become a "pipeline for terrorists." 18° Furthermore, Indonesia has cited the 
American use of Guantanamo to propose building an offshore prison camp to 
hold people it suspects of being terrorists. 181 
Secondly in relation to international humanitarian law, the United States' 
refusal to even consider whether individuals may be entitled to POW status may 
return to haunt it should United States soldiers fall into enemy hands in the 
course of a future armed conflict. 
Historically, the United States has been regarded as a champion of human 
rights and international law. However the approach it has adopted at 
Guantanamo, and in respect of the "war on terror" generally, has tarnished that 
image and led one commentator to observe that "in a remarkably short time, the 
United States has moved from being the principal supporter of [human rights and 
international law] to its most visible outlier."182 Only time will tell whether this 
change in approach is permanent, or simply a temporary eclipse in the United 
States' attitude towards international law. 183 
The third anniversary of the 11 September attacks approaches later this year 
and the dramatic images of the attacks, and their aftermath, continues to leave an 
indelible mark on the memory of all of those who witnessed the events unfold. 
178 
Harold Hongju Koh "Rights to Remember" (1 November 2003) The Economist London 23, 
24 . 
179 Koh, above, 24. 
18° Koh, above, 24. 
181 Koh, above, 24. 
182 Koh, above, 24. 
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No one can deny the importance of bringing those behind the attacks to justice 
and in taking steps to ensure that such attacks can never happen again. However 
in responding to terrorism, a measured response is desirable, consistent with the 
principles of the law. For as Theodore Roosevelt noted in his Third Annual 
Message to the United States Congress, delivered almost 100 years ago: "[n]o 
man is above the law and no man below it."184 
183Koh, above, 26. 
184 President Roosevelt Third Annual Message to Congress (7 December 1903). 
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